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Kotlar & Chrisman (this issue) examine how family involvement influences organizational change 
resulting in change behavior distinctive from that of non-family firms. Family firms, however, are 
heterogeneous in terms of their goals, governance, and resources; therefore, the behavioral 
distinctions proposed by Kotlar & Chrisman are not common to all family firms. In this article, we 
briefly discuss these sources of heterogeneity and their implications for organizational change and 
change management in family firms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A substantial body of research has focused on understanding the differences between family 
firms and non-family firms with respect to change (e.g., Kotlar, De Massis, Frattini, Bianchi, & 
Fang, 2013); but recent studies note that the heterogeneity of family firms influences firm 
strategies and management behaviors, in some situations leading to a greater variation among 
family firms than that between family firms and non-family firms. Differences in goals 
(Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012; Kotlar & De Massis, 2013), governance (Steier, 
Chrisman & Chua, 2015; Le Breton Miller & Miller, 2006; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006), 
and resources (Eddleston, Kellerman’s & Sarathy, 2008; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003) appear to be the 
most important sources of family firm heterogeneity (Chua, Chrisman, Steier, & Rau, 2012; De 
Massis, Kotlar, Chua & Chrisman, 2014). In this article, as a counterpoint to Kotlar & Chrisman 
(this issue), we discuss how heterogeneity in family firm goals, governance, and resources 
influences organizational change. We hope these initial insights about the main drivers of change 
and change management among different types of family firms will help stimulate future 
research at the intersection of change management and family business research. 
FAMILY FIRM HETEROGENEITY AND INNOVATION 
As pointed out by Kotlar and Chrisman (this issue), family firms behave, on average, 
differently from their non-family counterparts in many ways, including innovation. This difference 
in behavior arises partly from the family firms’ pursuance of family-centered non-economic goals 
(FCNE) that are rarely salient in non-family firms; partly from the resources unique to family 
firms; and partly from governance (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999; Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, 
Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012; 
Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2014; Chua, Chrisman, & De Massis 2015). For example, the goal of 
keeping control and power within the family makes the family firm less willing to involve external 
non-family financial and human capital which are typically needed in innovation, thus limiting the 
innovation resources available to family firms in general (e.g., Chrisman & Patel, 2012). In 
addition, aside from the extensive resource inputs required, outcomes from innovation are highly 
uncertain. As a result, family firms tend to adopt a more risk averse governance approach to 
investing in Research and Development (R&D). This is because the family investing its own 
savings and innovation failures would dissipate both economic and FCNE benefits (Chrisman & 
Patel, 2012). Consequently, family firms tend to invest more in process than product innovation 
because of the former’s higher probability of success (Broekaert, Andries, & Debackere, 2016). 
This could be why the lower investment in R&D does not appear to have resulted in lower 
innovation outcome in family firms (Classen, Carree, Van Gils, & Peters, 2014). However, 
although these differences in average behavior pointed out by Kotlar and Chrisman (this issue) are 
supported by both theory and suggested by evidence, heterogeneity of scope and intensity in family 
firms’ pursuance of non-economic goals, preservation of unique family governance mechanisms, 
and protection of specific family resources can cause wide variations in family firms’ attitudes and 
behaviors in innovation (Chrisman, Chua, De Massis, Frattini, & Wright, 2015). 
The nature of family owners’ goals plays a key role in determining the valence of family 
ownership’s influence on R&D investments (Sciascia, Nordqvist, Mazzola, & De Massis, 2015) 
and family firms do vary in the willingness and intensity with which they pursue FCNE goals such 
as family harmony (Astrachan & Jaskiewicz, 2008; Sharma, Chrisman, Pablo, & Chua, 2001); 
family social status (Dyer & Whetten, 2006; Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008); and family/firm 
identity linkage (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Milton, 2008). For example, when the equilibrium 
favors FCNE goals, innovation could be compromised to preserve family harmony if innovation 
would affect the livelihood of a family member. Each functioning family firm will have its own 
equilibrium in emphasis between economic and FCNE goals based on its history, values, culture 
and vision. From the longitudinal view, this equilibrium will change with the family’s growth and 
transition. For example, Litz and Kleysen (2001) observe that the dreams and vision of family 
members from different generations are not always congruent. In their study of the Brubeck jazz 
musician family, they show that the different combinations of dreams and vision between two 
generations result in different attitudes toward innovation. Since family firms are not at the same 
stage of growth and transition, their innovation behaviors will vary. This also means that the 
innovation behavior of those family firms whose equilibrium in goal-emphasis shifts over time to 
focus more on economic (FCNE) than on FCNE (economic) goals would evolve to become more 
(less) like non-family firms.  
Taking a cross-sectional view, Kammerlander & Ganter (2014) show that the family CEOs’ 
specific non-economic goals, such as maintaining power and control in the hands of the family, 
preserving family values, maintaining family reputation, and sustaining personal ties determine 
how these firms respond to the emergence of technological change. The goal to maintain family 
power and control may call for an immediate strategic and innovative change but the goal of 
conserving the business’ financial value may require a longer-term view and re-evaluation prior to 
responding to a technological change. Thus, heterogeneity in family firm CEOs’ non-economic 
goals can cause wide variations in family firms’ responses to technological change. Family firms’ 
FCNE goals may also interact with their economic status to influence these firms’ innovation 
strategies. Among family firms with financial performance below aspirations, some non-economic 
goals, such as maintaining family control, become more urgent and will align with economic goals 
to encourage R&D input (Patel & Chrisman, 2014; Sciascia, Nordqvist, Mazzola, & De Massis, 
2015)). To summarize, although some theoretical predictions and the empirical evidence show that 
family firms’ innovation behavior is different, on average, from that of non-family firms, there 
will be great variation among family firms’ innovation behavior because of heterogeneity in the 
relative emphasis of economic and FCNE goals (Chrisman, Chua, De Massis, Frattini, & Wright, 
2015).   
Family firms adopt a diversity of governance structures that affect their strategic 
behaviors. Consequently, the relationship between family firm governance structure and 
performance is non-linear and context-dependent (De Massis, Kotlar, Campopiano, & Cassia, 
2013). For example, although existing empirical studies suggest that family firms, in general, 
have lower innovation input but higher innovation output (De Massis, Frattini & Lichtenthaler, 
2013), these effects may be contingent on how many generations, and which generations, are 
involved in the multi-generation dynamics of family firm governance. Through a meta-analysis 
of 108 studies from 42 countries, Duran, Kammerlander, van Essen, & Zellweger (2016) find 
that such effects are stronger in firms with later-generation family member CEOs and weaker in 
firms with founder CEOs.  
Given that many dominant families own or control not only one business but a portfolio 
of businesses, the strategic behavior of the business units may also depend on the unit’s 
importance in the portfolio (Carney & Gedajlovic, 2003). Whether a business unit facing 
innovation challenges is categorized as core or peripheral in the portfolio will affect the family’s 
investments in business unit’s innovation (Michael-Tsabari, Labaki, & Zachary, 2014). 
Therefore, heterogeneity in how the controlling family classifies a business unit causes variation 
in the innovation behavior of family firms. 
According to the resource-based view (RBV), family firm innovation behavior may vary 
due to heterogeneous family-specific and firm-specific resources (Habbershon & Williams, 
1999). Within environments rich in innovation opportunities, family firms economizing both 
family-specific and firm-specific resources could achieve better performance (Eddleston, 
Kellermanns, & Sarathy, 2008). Some scholars also point out that the family firm’s non-family 
human resources could be affected by bifurcation bias – systematic treatment of family managers 
as stewards and of non-family managers as agents (Verbeke & Kano, 2012). Heterogeneity in the 
severity of the bifurcation bias, especially among family firms operating in an environment of 
fast growth and technological change, will affect a family firm’s access to external knowledge 
and resources, the lack of which leads to innovation inefficiency and ineffectiveness. To 
summarize, heterogeneity in goals, governance, and resources of family firms will cause 
variations in their innovation behaviors. This is consistent with the notion that unlocking the 
innovation potential of family firms requires a fit between the heterogeneity of their innovation 
decisions and their distinctive characteristics in terms of goals, governance, and resources (De 
Massis, Di Minin & Frattini, 2015). 
FAMILY FIRM HETEROGENEITY AND MANAGEMENT SUCCESSION 
Intra-family management succession is a central topic in family business research 
(Marler, Botero, & De Massis, 2017) because it affects family firm performance (Smith & 
Amoako-Adu, 1999; Bennedsen, Nielsen, Perez-Gonzalez, & Wolfenzon, 2007). Scholars (e.g., 
Gomez-Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson & Moylan-Fuentes, 2007; Chua, Chrisman, & 
De Massis, 2015) suggest that family firms accumulate future flows of FCNE benefits into a 
stock of socio-emotional wealth (SEW), and preservation of the accumulated SEW is a major 
driver of family firm behavior. They further suggest that maintaining family control and 
sustaining such control through generations is the best way of preserving SEW. Hence, the 
intention for intra-family succession distinguishes family firms from their non-family 
counterparts because such succession is very rarely possible in the latter (Chua, Chrisman, & 
Sharma, 1999). Besides, it is an important driver of FCNE goal pursuance (Chrisman, Chua, 
Pearson & Barnett, 2012) and affects the controlling family’s valuation of the business 
(Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman & Chua, 2012). Furthermore, intra-family management 
succession may be an organizational response to less protective institutions and a means to 
protect the family firms’ financial and human resources (Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer 2003). 
Heterogeneity in individual, relational, contextual, and financial conditions can promote 
or hinder the controlling family’s goal for intra-family succession (De Massis, Chua & 
Chrisman, 2008). For example, family incumbents’ attitude toward intra-family succession, 
which precedes intention and behavior, is influenced by heterogeneity in situational and 
relationship factors (De Massis, Sieger, Chua, & Vismara, 2016). In addition, diversity in family 
firm governance structures makes the intra-family management succession process even more 
complex. For example, Nordqvist, Sharma, & Chirico (2014) identify nine configurations of 
family firm governance varying in terms of involvement in ownership and management. In 
relation to management, family members may be involved in operation, supervision, and/or 
capital investment decisions within different fora: top management team, board of directors, 
advisory board, and/or family meetings. Thus, the management succession process is very 
industry- and firm-specific, affected by the knowledge and capabilities required to perform the 
governance and managerial duties and responsibilities. Some scholars (e.g., Dyer, 1989; Hall & 
Nordqvist, 2008; Stewart and Hitt, 2012) also find that despite the advantages of management 
professionalization, many family firms do not do so or only do so partially. 
Heterogeneity in the resources that family firms possess could also influence intra-family 
management succession. Small and medium family firms tend to have an adequate number of 
family members to fill the management positions in their simple organizational structures. 
However, as family firms grow, the families’ human resource pools are no longer sufficient to 
meet the firms’ needs for the increased number of management positions, thus requiring greater 
non-family manager participation (Fang, Randolph, Memili, & Chrisman, 2016). Furthermore, 
contextual factors, such as the legal system, property rights protection, and the professional 
manager market also influence resource access and preservation in family firms. In sum, 
heterogeneity in the goals, governance, and resources of family firms will cause differences in 
their intra-family succession behavior. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, we have briefly outlined some of the implications of heterogeneity among family 
firms for organizational change and change management. Although the family business literature 
has only begun to scratch the surface of the issues that need to be investigated, research on 
family firm innovation and management succession suggests that heterogeneity in family firm 
goals, governance, and resources is likely to be an important driver of change and change 
management behaviors among different family firms. Our conclusion is that merely considering 
family involvement is not enough to fully understand the distinctive change behaviors of family 
firms, since the nature and extent of the involvement vary among family firms depending on 
their goals, governance, and resources. Therefore, we agree with Kotlar and Chrisman (this 
issue) that more research is needed on the wide variety of changes to the strategies, structures, 
systems, and processes of family firms (cf., Chrisman, Chua, De Massis, Minola, & Vismara, 
2016). Existing theory needs to be further extended and enriched to provide more nuanced 
predictions about how heterogeneity among family firms influences organizational change as 
well as the role of key contingencies producing such heterogeneity. We hope that this article will 
help motivate scholars to conduct further theoretical and empirical investigations on how 
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